By Susan J. Fleck. Spring, 2002.
Knowledge is the eye of
desire and can become the pilot of the soul. --Will Durant
Pleasure's couch is
virtue's grave. --Augustine J. Duganne
When power leads man
toward arrogance, poetry reminds him of his limitations. When power narrows the areas of man's concern,
poetry reminds him of the richness and diversity of his existence. When power
corrupts, poetry cleanses. --John
Fitzgerald Kennedy
Justice and power must
be brought together, so that whatever is just may be powerful, and whatever is
powerful may be just. --Blaise Pascal
Remember, democracy
never lasts long. It soon wastes, exhausts, and murders itself. There never was a democracy yet that
did not commit suicide. --John Quincy
Adams
Plato’s The Republic was voted the greatest philosophy work ever written in
a recent survey of over 1,000 philosophers and academics. This seems ironic to Fiachra Gibbons, who states
that most modern thinkers “would rubbish almost all of what he said” (“Thinking”).
According to Ralph Wedgwood, American scholars compare Pericles’ Funeral
Oration to
Plato had lived through the Peloponnesian
War in which
Thucydides, the historian who
recorded Pericles’ “Funeral Oration,” like Plato, observed human nature through
tumultuous political times of revolutions and civil conflict during the
Peloponnesian war. Like Plato, he
reflects why human nature causes societies to degenerate, especially during
such revolutions. Plato calls the four
forms of government other than one like that extolled in the Republic “vicious.” Similarly, Wedgwood calls Thucydides
description of societal breakdown a “vicious spiral.” During wartime, because the supply of even
life’s basic necessities is unstable, people become desperate and anxious to
gain power to secure themselves against dangers. Since people are inherently power hungry,
greedy and ambitious, according to Thucydides, wartime spawns more drastic
action to satisfy these desires. Further
instability arises from this fierce competition: envy and resentment are piled on top of greed
and lust for power. All of these
conditions lead to a lack of respect for law and justice: these passions seek
private advantages and do not pay any deference for the common good of society
as a whole (“Thucydides”). Before the rapid decline of
Justice is achieved through the laws for Pericles, and there is equal justice for all in a democracy which by definition “favours the many instead of the few. . .” In a democracy, men are not restricted by their social standing, class or poverty (as long as they are in the class “citizens”). There is freedom to do what one pleases, freedom to participate in public life, and tolerance toward others who may do as they please, insofar as there is respect for the law. The law provides justice for the injured (57). Plato devotes the whole first book of the Republic in an attempt to define justice, only to have Socrates conclude that “the virtue of the soul is justice . . .; a just man will live well . . .; living well involves well-being and happiness; . . . [therefore] only the just man is happy . . . injustice then, can never pay better than justice” (353e-354a). This did not get to the basis of a definition for justice.
Socrates proceeds to describe the ideal state. After constructing such a state, he takes another tack at discovering the essence of justice. Assuming the state is “good in the complete sense of the word . . . then, it is wise, brave, temperate, and just” (427e). To Plato, then, the “Good” is “Virtue.” Virtue is a complex whole, comprised of those four qualities. If he can determine the nature of wisdom, courage and temperance, then Plato feels confident that the remaining attribute, justice, will be the very thing that “makes it possible for the [other] three” (433c). He had already established the principle that an individual ought to fulfill the one function in the society which conforms to that individual’s nature. This amounts to minding one’s business and not meddling in others’ affairs. This principle, or a form of it, Plato avers, is justice (433a). This was important to establish: it formed the basis for justifying defined roles for citizens in a just society. Division of labor is discussed later in this paper.
Next, we will consider pleasure, flourishing, and private property. Pericles proudly states: “Further, we provide
plenty of means for the mind to refresh itself from business. We celebrate games and sacrifices all year
round, and the elegance of our private establishments forms a daily source of
pleasure . . . while the magnitude of our city draws the produce of the world
into our harbour . . .” (57). Plato also recognized that men
need comforts and luxuries beyond bare necessities in order to have a state
worthy of human life—something more than what Glaucon calls “a community of
pigs” (373a). In both Pericles’
However, in this Republic, the guardians could not have luxuries or any kind of private property: this is intended to ensure that they will “have the best chance of being gentle and humane to one another and to their charges . . .” (416c-e). If they were to ever come into ownership of land or other kinds of private property, “they will give up their guardianship for the management of their farms and households and become tyrants at enmity with their fellow citizens instead of allies” (417b). The communism of the Republic is intended to ensure unity with the guardian citizens “bound together by sharing in the same pleasures and pains.” Disunity would come about “when the words “mine” and “not mine” . . . are not applied to the same things throughout the community” (462c).
Plato takes communism much further than merely communal living and sharing of all material property: the guardian classes must hold all wives and children in common. As if that were not extreme enough, by means of deceptions that only the rulers would know about, there would be strict control of sexual unions and “breeding” to produce the best possible progeny (457b 459e). Children born of “inferior” parents and “defective” children are to be secretly hidden away; children born from certain incestuous, non-sanctioned, relationships are to be disposed of (461c). All of these measures are intended to keep the whole of the commonwealth as strong as possible.
Plato defends this austere form of life for the guardians by recounting its benefits. The guardians will be free from quarrels, lawsuits and prosecution that arise from property ownership; they will live in peace and harmony with one another; they escape all the burdens of raising a family and earning a living by other means; they will be honored while they still live and will have a “worthy” burial when they die. Plato avers that the protector guardians will have a better life than any Olympic victor (464e 465b-c 466b). However, Plato is aware that some guardians may become “possessed with some silly and childish notion of happiness,” that may induce them to use their power for material gain: those guardians are advised to stick to the moderate and secure way of living designated for them (466c). I’m sure that Plato has in mind a “right” kind of education (brainwashing) that will prevent, or at least minimize, any guardian from conceiving happiness as anything other than what the Republic has designed for them.
For those artisans and working classes who are allowed to have land, property and families, they must still guard against being consumed by the passions of wealth and desire—that would cause a divided soul. It is common opinion “that all the luxury and wealth and power in the world cannot make life worth living when the bodily constitution is going to rack and ruin . . .” (445a). Even in Pericles’ democracy, this Greek ideal of moderation would be upheld. Nevertheless, elegance and pleasure is celebrated in Pericles’ vision of democracy: “We cultivate refinement without extravagance and knowledge without effeminacy; wealth we employ more for use than for show . . .” (57). Plato is not so optimistic about most people’s behavior when it comes to moderation. In Plato’s commonwealth, the pleasures and desires of the masses must be controlled, not by the reasoning minds of the individuals, but rather by “the desires and wisdom of the superior few” (431d). What makes up temperance in individuals of the multitude is the fact that they agree with the “superior few” about who should be the rulers (432a).
Let us turn now to see how these two regard foreign policy, courage, and education. Pericles describes a liberal policy of opening doors to foreigners “although the eyes of an enemy may occasionally profit by our liberality; trusting less in system and policy than to the native spirit of our citizens . . . (57). In generosity we are equally singular . . . And it is only the Athenians, who, fearless of consequences, confer their benefits not from calculations of expediency, but in the confidence of liberality” (58). Plato did not talk about generosity, per se, in the Republic; certainly not in the sense of being a state within the whole world order. Plato’s focus was in constructing an ideal, just commonwealth; one that was more or less self-contained whereby the citizens benefited from the harmony of the whole and were protected from outside predators by the guardians. It seems that Plato’s republic would have an isolationist policy when it came to dealings with other states, lest it become corrupted by others’ mere beliefs. This was certainly the case in the twentieth century where the most severe forms of communism were contained in closed societies that “protected” its citizens from outside “corrupting” influences.
Regarding education and courage,
Pericles explains that in Athens, where men live “exactly as we please,” this
is in contrast to rivals, e.g. Sparta, who “seek after manliness” by means of
“painful discipline” that begins in very early childhood. Even though
Another device Plato uses for a proper education is strict censorship of literature, especially poetry and drama. Pericles, in his defense of democracy, gives priority to historical facts over prose: “. . . far from needing a Homer for our panegyrist, or other of his craft whose verses might charm for the moment only for the impression which they gave to melt at the touch of fact, we have forced every sea and land to be the highway of our daring, and everywhere, whether for evil or for good, have left imperishable monuments behind us” (58). Plato was a much stronger critic of the poets and dramatists. Guardians must not participate in any kind of imitation, especially if it involves anything representing mean or shameful acts, “lest from enjoying the imitation they come to enjoy the reality” (395c). There is censorship in the Republic: “We shall ask Homer and the other poets not to be angry if we delete these and all similar passages” (387b). There is control of the artists and other craftsmen: they are forbidden to represent any character or characteristic that is “vicious, mean, unrestrained, or graceless.” Those who do not follow the correct guidelines are forbidden to work in the commonwealth (401b).
In general, all individuals in Plato’s Republic must have the right kind of mental and bodily training to hone the abilities and characteristics of their reasoning and spirited portions of their natures so that they can be in command over the appetitive nature, lest the appetites grow so powerful as to overtake and enslave the reasoning and spirited natures. Plato takes compulsory education to the extreme for the elect few philosopher-kings-to-be:
It is for
us, then, as founders of a commonwealth, to bring compulsion to bear on the
noblest natures. They must be made to
climb the ascent to the vision of Goodness, which we called the highest object
of knowledge; and, when they have looked upon it long enough, they must not be
allowed, as they now are, to remain on the heights, refusing to come down again
to the prisoners [in reference to the parable of the caves] or to take any part
in their labours and rewards, however much or little these may be worth. (519d)
Let us look closer at this strict division of labor and citizens’ roles. In Pericles’ democracy, citizens who refuse to take part in public life and politics are considered to be useless. Even though the citizens have both private business and other matters that occupy much of their time, Pericles still considers them to be “fair judges of public matters” (58). Plato disagrees with the notion that “ordinary citizens” could be fair judges of public matters. In the Republic there would be a class of Rulers, specially educated, and free from “ordinary work” to manage the affairs of the state. Plato also strongly disagrees that everyone should partake in politics. Rather, Plato has proposed a radical society where the divisions of labor and functions are clearly delineated among individuals. It would be disastrous to the community if one person, who is suited to be an artisan and not suited for politics, were to “rob” another person, who is suited to lead, of a political office based on some advantage such as wealth or bodily strength. That would be injustice. Justice comes about only “when each order—tradesman, Auxiliary, guardian—keeps to its own proper business . . . and does its own work . . .” (434b-c).
Regarding the role of women, Pericles states: “. . . if I must say anything on the subject of female excellence . . . Great will be your glory in not falling short of your natural character, and greatest will be hers who is least talked of among the men, whether for good or for bad” (60). He does not say specifically what her natural character entails, but we can be sure it is not to go out to talk and fight alongside the men. On the other hand, Plato has proposed for women an extraordinary change in status and roles. In his ideal republic, women will have the same roles and functions as men; they are considered to have abilities equal to men, except that they are not as strong; and they are to have the same education as men. This, of course, is still all in the confines of women being selected for certain tasks and roles based upon their inherent natures, just as is the case for men in this commonwealth (452a).
Plato knows that what he is proposing for both men and women is radical: he needs to create a fable, what some translators call a “noble lie,” in order to get the community and the Rulers themselves to accept (414c). If individuals were made to believe that they were fashioned differently, e.g., out of different metals, then they would understand that it is in their nature to have different roles in the community (415). The Rulers are fashioned out of the finest medal, gold. The rulers in the Republic should be philosophers, else “there can be no rest from troubles” and the commonwealth could not “grow to its full stature” (473d).
Plato defines a philosopher as “one
who desires all wisdom,” one “who has a taste for every sort of knowledge and
throws himself into acquiring it with an insatiable curiosity” (475c).
Besides the wisdom that philosophers would bring to their office, since
they have no love or hunger for power, there would be no mutually destructive
fighting that normally goes on between men who seek power and control. When it is suggested that it is an injustice
to force a certain kind of life on philosophers, one that may cause them to
have a worse life than they might otherwise have, Plato retorts: “. . . the law is not concerned to make any
one class specially happy, but to ensure the welfare of the commonwealth as a
whole. By persuasion or constraint it
will unite the citizens in harmony, making them share whatever benefits each
class can contribute to the common good . . .” (519e).
It seems as if Karl Marx wrote his Manifesto
straight from the Republic—at least
the part about giving according to ones’ means and taking according to ones’ needs.[2]
Knowledge is important also in Pericles’ democracy and it is obtained through the public discourse of its citizens: “. . . instead of looking on discussion as a stumbling-block in the way of action, we think it an indispensable preliminary to any wise action at all . . .” (58). However, Wedgwood points out that Thucydides thought that moral standards were undermined by a shift in the usage of terms: people change their moral standards to conform to the course of action that they are pursuing (“Thucydides”). It is just this kind of decay of Truth that Plato wants to avert. In the republic, “the wisdom it possesses as a whole will be due to the knowledge residing in the smallest part, the one which takes the lead and governs the rest” (429). This small class is, of course, the philosopher-kings. The philosopher is one that “knows, while the other has only a belief in appearances” (476d). Belief, for Plato, is a state of mind between ignorance, corresponding to the unreal, and knowledge, corresponding to the real and “the power of knowing the real as it is” (478a). Conventional notions about things that are beautiful, honorable, just, etc., “are adrift in a sort of twilight between pure reality and pure unreality” (479d). Only philosophers are capable of comprehending the form of real beauty, honor, and justice. Only they, then, can be guides to lead others to these real forms (479e). This is very important for the masses, and therefore for the whole state, to eventually come to “the essential nature of the Good, from which everything that is good and right derives its value for us” (505a). Only the philosophers can be guardians of state institutions and customs “which are desirable and right” because only they possess the knowledge of why they are good (506a).
Books VI and VII of the Republic contain much of Plato’s epistemology—his theory of Forms and his famous Parable of the Cave. Many people think that the Republic contains most, if not all, of Plato’s essential philosophy and theories. It starts out as a quest for a definition for Justice. Then it evolves into a political discussion about what would comprise a just, or good, state. Plato had to delve into metaphysics and epistemology to form the foundation for the politics he is embracing—especially to defend such radical proposals. Plato, Aristotle, and Kant are among the few philosophers that understood that ethics, including politics, must rest on a firm foundation of metaphysics and epistemology. Religions rest their systems of morality on their spiritual metaphysics, but their epistemology relies on revealed truth of a god or other historical individuals. Most other philosophers, in order to ground their ideas, seem to rely on vague or commonly held beliefs about what is moral, such as the theme of altruism, without explaining why such notions are of the Good.
After Plato constructed the ideal republic and identified the three natures comprising the total of Justice, he examines the individual person’s soul to see if it contains the same corresponding three elements in order to determine if his strategy to examine the macro entity, the state, is a valid comparison to understand what justice is in an individual (435c). He concludes that individuals’ souls do have three elements: a reasoning faculty, to bring about wisdom; a spirited nature, to bring about courage; and an appetitive component that seeks fulfillment of bodily needs and desires. We can be a just person, and fulfill our proper role in society, only insofar as “the several parts of our nature fulfill theirs” (441e).
In his foretelling of the three waves of protest against him, Plato was well aware that he would be seen as either like a Fascist or totalitarian communist. Why did he put his ideas into such a form that seems like it cannot be defended? Perhaps the writings in The Republic are meant to be used like wallpaper along the lining of the cave on the path leading to the sunlight. These, then, will serve as arrows and guides; they will assist in the unlocking of our chains, but we must stand and walk into the light on our own. We must bring these words out into the light, examine them, think for ourselves, and only then can we “see” the Real Truth that lay within. On the other hand, those of us in pursuit of individual happiness, according to the spirit and ideals of our American founding fathers, are more inclined to appreciate Pericles’ picture of the ideal social order.
***
Baird, Forrest E. and Walter Kaufmann, eds. Ancient
Philosophy. 3rd ed.
Gibbons, Fiachra. “The Thinking Person’s Favourite
Thinkers.” The Guardian.
Pericles (as reported by Thucydides). “Funeral Oration.” Trans. Richard
Plato. “Republic (in part).” Trans. Francis MacDonald Cornford. Baird and Kaufmann 212-281.
---. Plato’s Republic. Trans. G.M.A. Grube.
Wedgwood, Ralph Nicholas. “Lectures on
Thucydides.” Spring 1998.
---. “Socrates’ Apology.” Fall 1997.
< http://web.mit.edu/wedgwood/www/teaching/ancient97/socrates-1.html>
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