Beyond Ethical Egoism

By Susan J. Fleck. March, 1996.

Focus on James Rachels' Paper

In his article, Egoism and Moral Skepticism, James Rachels presents some convincing arguments exposing the weakness of both the psychological egoism and ethical egoism positions. However, his paper is fraught with problems. I intend to reveal the weaknesses in Rachels’ arguments, and will expose his gross distortion of Ayn Rand’s view. Along the way, I will compare classical ethical egoism with Rand’s “rational-selfishness”, and demonstrate that her views withstand Rachel’s objections. I will show how Rand can take us beyond ethical egoism while bypassing the lure of altruism.

In debunking psychological egoism, Rachels claims that what makes an act selfish is its object, not that you want to do it. He declares: “If you often want to please others, you are kind. If you want to harm them, you are malicious.” ^(1,
458) What if you don’t want to do either of these? Is this another either/or trap? Would your actions be morally neutral, i.e., neither kind nor malicious, if you did things neither to help or to harm others, but instead, you did things to further your own life’s goals? Rachels presents a classic example of what Rand calls the “package-deal” within classical ethical theories whereby one must adopt a choice for either selfishness or altruism in one’s moral code of ethics, which in turn defines the actions one will pursue. ^(2,252)

Glaucon, in Plato’s Republic, according to Rachels, proclaimed: “No one, it is commonly believed, would have such iron strength of mind as to stand fast in doing right or keep his hands off other men’s goods . . . He would behave no better than the other.” Rachels asks, and why shouldn’t he behave in the manner described, since there is no chance of punishment? “What reason is there for him to continue being ‘moral’ when it is not to his own advantage to do so?” ^(1,
460) Two assumptions are being made here: First, the reason to be moral is based on a negative motivation - i.e., so one won’t rot in prison or in hell. Second, he is assuming that one cannot be both moral and do what one pleases - that these are inherently incompatible and inconsistent.

Misrepresentation of Ayn Rand

Rachels believes this to be Ayn Rand’s view of ethical egoism: “Of course it is possible for people to act altruistically, and perhaps many people do act that way - but there is no reason why they should do so. A person is under no obligation to do anything except what is in his own interests.” Although he thinks Rand’s theory is confusing, nevertheless, he proceeds to give an example to demonstrate the “radical” nature of her doctrine. With this view, he claims, if I want to set a store on fire for the pleasure of seeing the blaze, the fact that others may die provides no reason for me not to do what I want, since I only need to think about my own interests. ^(1,
465-6) Rachels has committed two sins here. His first error is in taking one aspect of Rand’s theory out of context from her whole synthesis of egoist theory, in which he has tried to show her in alignment with classical ethical egoism. Secondly, he has grossly misrepresented even this one aspect of her doctrine by claiming that his fire example is a demonstration of her principles.

Rand’s doctrine of egoism, in which one’s own life is an end in itself, it is the highest objective standard of value which one ought to obtain and maintain, rests on two major principles. The first principle is that one should not sacrifice oneself for the sake of others, nor ask that others sacrifice themselves for your sake. The second, “Trader Principle”, emerges from the first most basic principle, and claims that there is no inherent conflict of interest among people who earn the values of their existence, and who deal with one another by trading value for value. According to Rand, free, voluntary, uncoerced trade is the only rational and moral principle for all human relationships, whether personal or social, private or public, spiritual or material. The trader principle recognizes neither masters nor slaves in human relations and acknowledges no polarization between the individual and the society in which that individual lives, if that society is genuinely human. ^{(2, 251)}

No Masters or Slaves

In another argument against psychological egoism, Rachels asserts:

. . . it is nothing more than shabby sophistry to say, because Smith takes satisfaction in helping his friend, that he is behaving selfishly. . . . if we speak slowly, and pay attention to what we are saying, it sounds plain silly. Moreover, suppose we ask why Smith derives satisfaction from helping his friend. The answer will be, it is because Smith cares for him and wants him to succeed. . . . and we must want to attain the goal before we can find any satisfaction in it. . . . and because we desire these things, we derive satisfaction from attaining them. ^{(1, 463)}

I would ask that Rachels speak slowly and pay attention to what he just said - he almost sounds Randian here! It is not a sacrifice, when we do things for those we care about, because we have a hierarchy of values, and those we care about come high on that list. Yes, we may forgo some other form of pleasure in order to help a friend in need, but the personal pleasure within this particular context has a lower value. Therefore, whatever sense of pleasure, satisfaction, good will, etc., we derive from helping those we care about can only assist in fostering the relationships, which in turn creates more value for all involved. If, on the other hand, a friend has come to expect that you continue to sacrifice your personal desires based on his needs alone, there is no longer a bond of friendship based on mutual love and respect.

When is One Being Selfish?

In an effort to end some confusion, Rachels makes a distinction between the concepts of self-interest and selfishness with this example: “If I see a physician when I am feeling poorly, I am acting in my own interest but no one would think of calling me “selfish” on account of it.” ^{(1, 464)} However, if you were living in a supposedly ideal, commune-like environment, where ‘each should give according to his ability and take only according to his need’ - your ‘need’ would, indeed, be questioned and envied by many, and considered selfish, since others are going to have to work harder to pay for the bills. Some poor people even in our own free society resent when rich people, regardless of how hard they have worked, go to private doctors and private hospitals, when there may be many people which the poor perceive need a doctor’s care more than you do. Contrary to what Rachels states here, there are those who would call him “selfish.” And this gets to the crux of the matter in dealing with the accepted notion of the term “selfish”. When you begin to make analogies like these, where do you draw the line? What kinds of things and actions can one safely put on the debit side of his account, so one can feel free to do them without being deemed as being immoral, or “selfish”, and what kinds of things go on the credit side of the fence?

Rachels explains his criteria for making those judgments:

. . . selfish behavior is behavior that ignores the interests of others, in circumstances in which their interests ought not to be ignored. This concept has a definite evaluative flavor; to call someone “selfish” is not just to describe his action but to condemn it. Thus, you would not call me selfish for eating a normal meal in normal circumstances (although it may surely be in my self-interest); but you would call me selfish for hoarding food while others about are starving. ^{(1, 464}
⁾

Always Someone Who Needs

It is the ‘while others are about starving’ that tends to become broadened by an altruistic mentality such that one can no longer be free to choose, and one must be altruistic because there are always those who are starving - somewhere ‘about.’ One is constantly being made to feel guilty for enjoying the luxuries and fruits of one’s labor because there are so many others who are in some kind of need. We are back to the same problem: What are the standards, or criteria, to be applied to determine what are the circumstances in which others’ interest ought not to be ignored? According to Rand, one must use one’s judgment in the context of the individual lives involved to determine the moral thing to do, according to one’s own hierarchy of values. ^{(2, 240)} Furthermore, with her view, no other individuals have any moral claims to determine what your actions should be.

Although Rachels has misrepresented Rand’s theory, he has, however, presented the prevailing understanding of ethical egoism and “selfishness.” He points out the logical impossibility for a decent society to be formed from this form of egoism, and thus succeeds in blasting the notion that one ought to act only in one’s self interest, regardless of the consequences to other humans. This form of egoism cannot be universally adopted by everyone. ^{(1, 467)} One can easily see that this would produce the reverse effect if we were to use Harry Browne’s analogy whereby happiness is symbolized by a big rubber ball. Instead of continuing to pass off the ball to others, in an altruistic manner, whereby no one is seen to benefit, the participants in the egoist ball game are scrapping to obtain the ball only for themselves no matter what they have to do to the others to gain the advantage. ^{(1, 453)}

Ethical Egoism vs. Rational Egoism

With this sort of ‘eat or be eaten,’ ‘kill or be killed,’ egoist mentality, we would have to agree with Rachels that this policy could not be universalized, and therefore, ethical egoism is inconsistent as a normative theory. What I object to, in this line of thinking, is Rachels’ claim that the rational egoist cannot advocate that egoism be universally adopted. ^{(1, 466)} What Rachels is describing is the “selfish” egoist in the classical, accepted sense of the meaning of selfish. One must question his use of “rational” in conjunction with “egoist”. If he means rationally, or logically, a ‘kill or be killed’ egoist cannot advocate universality in action, then we would have to agree. However, Rachels speculates that ethical egoism can be maintained consistently by advocating universal altruism in so far as all other people are to be altruists. In this regard, in the sense that he is expecting to receive the unearned, the egoist could be said to be practicing altruism, in the transactional sense, as the receiver and not the giver. ^{(2, 235)} Therefore, even though an individual egoist must be deceitful in promoting universal altruism, Rachels describes him as being thoroughly rational to advocate what is required as a means to his own ends. ^{(1, 468)} I would argue that this is not a rational principle for how we ought to act, insofar as we would end up with the same vicious circle in that everyone ought to deceive everyone else in order to fulfill their own interests. This leads to the same logically impossible society.

On the other hand, what if Rand’s view of egoism is logically sound, in that the ‘eat or be eaten’ view is a false notion of humanity? If we had a universal society in which everyone both preached and practiced her principles of non-sacrifice and trading value for value, then would not we have a truly human, beneficial world and rational society? Her principles can be universally accepted and practiced with no breach in logic or morality.

Good of Others as Ethical Standard

Rachels conveys reasons why we should adopt the normative policies which give importance to the good of others:

The reason one ought not to do actions that would hurt other people is: Other people would be hurt. The reason one ought to do actions that would benefit other people is: Other people would be benefited. . . . The point is that the welfare of human beings is something that most of us value for its own sake, and not merely for the sake of something else. . . . It is not that we have no reason for pursuing these policies, but that our reason is that these policies are for the good of human beings. ^{(1, 468)}

If we accept this “common sense” view described by Rachels, then we must ask these two corresponding questions: a: If I should not want others to be hurt, or sacrificed, in order to benefit myself, then, should not I also demand that others not want to hurt or sacrifice me in order to benefit themselves? b: If I should do actions that would benefit other people, then should not I want others to do actions to benefit me? In other words, am I not also a member of the class of human beings? If Rachels would answer these in the affirmative, then he is supporting the primary dual principles of Randian ethics. If he would answer negatively, then he is making “human beings” the class of all others excluding me, and making the beneficiary of the action the criterion for the standard of ethics. He then would be ignoring the principle that one’s highest value is his own life for its own sake, and would be placing all others’ lives ahead of one’s own.

Rachels shows how both classical ethical egoism and ethical altruism are merely two sides of a false “package-deal” dichotomy: “Both require that the agent care about himself, or other people, before they can get started.” ^{(1, 469)} In this either / or vacuum, he leaves no room for the rational egoist who can care about both himself and other people. The truly rational egoist can value all lives, for their own sakes, but he values his own life as his own end and highest value. He has gone beyond ethical egoism and has avoided the “unselfishness trap” of altruism.

Works Cited

1. Sommers, Christina and Sommers, Fred, VICE & VIRTUE IN EVERYDAY LIFE : Introductory Readings in Ethics. Fort Worth: Harcourt Brace College Publishers, 1993.

Rachels, James, Egoism and Moral Skepticism. pp. 458 - 470.

Browne, Harry, The Unselfishness Trap. pp. 451 - 457

2. Sciabara, Chris Matthew, Ayn Rand : The Russian Radical. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995.

(MLA guidelines, using the number system for parenthetical documentation)